Type-flaw attacks and multi-protocol attacks are notorious threats to cryptographic protocol security. They are arguably the most commonly reported attacks on protocols. For nearly fifteen years, researchers have continuously emphasized the importance of preventing these attacks.
Introduction
A type-flaw attack on a protocol is an attack where a message variable of one type is essentially substituted with a message of a different type, to cause a violation of a security property. Preventing type-flaw attacks is crucial for security protocols since they are frequently reported in literature [10, 27, 36] .
In their pioneer work, Heather et al. proved that pairing constants called "tags" with each message, prevents type-flaw attacks [23] . However, Heather et al.'s work considered a basic protocol model with a free message algebra. Operators such as Exclusive-OR possess algebraic properties that violate the free algebra assumption, by inducing equational theories.
Another very important problem for security protocols is the problem of multiple protocols executing in parallel. This was shown to be a major cause for attacks on protocols [25, 16] . In an outstanding work, Guttman et al. tackled this problem and proved that if distinct protocol identifiers were to be inserted as tags inside all encrypted components, multi-protocol attacks can be prevented [21] , in the same year and conference as that of Heather et al.'s paper [22] . However, like Heather et al., they too consider a basic and standard model with a free term algebra.
Recent focus in research projects world-wide has been to extend protocol analysis to protocols that use operators possessing algebraic properties, to accommodate "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0 (e.g. [26, 18] ). Naturally, a corresponding study into type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks would be both crucial and interesting.
These are the problems we consider in this paper: We provide formal proofs to establish that suggestions similar to those made by Heather et al. and Guttman et al (to tag messages), are sufficient to prevent all type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks on security protocols even under the ACUN 1 algebraic properties of the Exclusive-OR (XOR) operator. Our proof approach extends that used by us in [29] , is general, and could be extended to other operators with equations such as Inverse and Idempotence in addition to ACUN. We give some intuitions for these in our conclusion.
Significance of the results to protocol analysis and verification. Preventing type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks is obviously beneficial to protocol security. However, there are also significant advantages to protocol analysis and verification:
• As Heather et al. pointed out, preventing type-flaw attacks also allows many unbounded verification approaches (e.g. [42, 11, 24] ) to be meaningful, since they assume the absence of type-flaw attacks;
• Similarly, preventing multi-protocol attacks ensures that it is sufficient to analyze protocols in isolation, which was found to be much less complicated than analyzing in multi-protocol environments [35, 25] ;
• Furthermore, knowing that these attacks can be prevented in advance, reduces complexity of analysis and substantially saves the search space for automated tools;
Note that, a substitution of n a ⊕ b ⊕ i to N A will make them equal, if an additional equation, say [w, x] ⊕ [y, z] = [w ⊕ y, x ⊕ z] is considered in addition to the ACUN theory.
In this case, [4, N A ]⊕ [5, b] will become [4⊕5, n a ⊕b⊕i⊕b], which is equal to [4⊕5, n a ⊕ i], which in turn is equal to the other term to be unified, [4, n a ] ⊕ [5, i] . However, in this paper, we consider only the ACUN algebraic properties of the ⊕ operator, but not equations where both the standard operators such as pairing and the XOR operator are combined. We do provide some insights into extending our work with such equations, in our conclusion.
In Sections 3, 4 and 5, we will prove formally that such tagging prevents all type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks on protocols in general, under the ACUN theory.
The Framework
In this section, we will describe our formal framework to model the design and analysis of protocols, which we subsequently use to achieve the proofs for our main results in Section 5.
We will define the term algebra in Section 3.1, the protocol model in Section 3.2, generating symbolic constraint sequences for protocol messages and checking their satisfiability in Section 3.3, the security properties desired of protocols and attacks on them in Section 3.4 and our main protocol design requirements to prevent type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks in Section 3.5.
Term Algebra
We will first introduce the construction of protocol messages using some basic elements and operators in Section 3.1.1. We will then introduce equational unification in Section 3.1.2.
We derive much of our concepts here from Tuengerthal's technical report [43] where he has provided an excellent and clear explanation of equational unification.
Terms
We will use italics font for sets, functions, and operators. On the other hand, we will use sans-serif font for predicates, equations and theories (described in Section 3.1.2).
We denote the term algebra as T (F, Vars), where Vars is a set of variables, and F is a set of function symbols or operators, called a signature. The terms in T (F, Vars) are called F -Terms. Further,
• Vars ⊂ T (F, Vars);
• (∀f ∈ F )(arity(f ) > 0 ∧ t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ T (F, Vars) ⇒ f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ T (F, Vars)).
The set of nullary function symbols are called constants. We assume that every variable and constant have a "type" such as Agent, Nonce etc., returned by a function type().
We define F as StdOps ∪ {XOR} ∪ Constants, where, StdOps = {sequence, penc, senc, pk , sh}.
Further, if f ∈ F and t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ T (F, Vars) then, type(f (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = f (type(t 1 ), . . . , type(t n )).
penc and senc denote asymmetric and symmetric encryption operators respectively. pk and sh denote public-key and shared-key operators respectively. We assume that they will always be used with one and two arguments respectively, that are of the type Agent.
We use some syntactic sugar in using some of these operators:
sequence(t 1 , . . . , t n ) = [t 1 , . . . , t n ], penc(t, k) = [t] k , XOR(t 1 , . . . , t n ) = t 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ t n .
We will omit the superscripts ↔ and → for encryptions if the mode of encryption is contextually obvious or irrelevant.
We will write a in [a 1 , . . . , a n ] if a ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a n }. We will denote the linear ordering relation of a sequence of elements, s, as ≺ s . For instance, if s is a sequence such that s = [s 1 , . . . , s n ], then, (∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n})((i < j) ⇒ (s i ≺ s s j )).
We define the subterm relation as follows:
. . , t n ) where f ∈ F and t ⊏ t ′′ for some t ′′ ∈ {t 1 , . . . , t n }.
We will use functions Vars(), Constants(), and SubTerms() on a single term or sets of terms, that return the variables, constants and subterms in them respectively. For instance, if T is a set of terms, SubTerms(T ) = {t | (∃t ′ ∈ T )(t ⊏ t ′ )}.
Equational Unification
We will now introduce the concepts of unification under equational theories. We will start off with some basic definitions:
Definition 1. [Substitution]
A substitution is a tuple x, X (denoted x/X), where x is a term and X is a variable. Let σ be a set of substitutions and t be a term. Then,
. . , t n σ), if f ∈ F, and t = f (t 1 , . . . , t n ).
We extend this definition to define substitutions to a set of terms: If T is a set of terms, then, T σ = {tσ | t ∈ T }.
We will now introduce equational theories.
Definition 2. [Identity and Equational Theory]
Given a signature F , and a set of variables Vars, a set of identities E is a subset of T (F, Vars) × T (F, Vars). We denote an identity as t ∼ = t ′ where t and t ′ belong to T (F, Vars). An equational theory (or simply a theory) = E is the least congruence relation on T (F, Vars), that is closed under substitution and contains E. i.e.,
For the signature of this paper, we define two theories, = STD and = ACUN . The theory = STD for StdOps-Terms is based on a set of identities between syntactically equal terms, except for those made with the operator sh:
The theory = ACUN is based on identities solely with the XOR (⊕) operator, reflecting the algebraic properties of XOR:
We will say that a term t is pure wrt theory = E iff there exists a substitution σ and a term t ′ such that t = t ′ σ and either 2 ≈ t ′ or t ′ ≈ belongs to E.
We will say that a term t is an alien subterm of t ′ wrt the theory = E iff it is not pure wrt = E :
We will now describe equational unification.
Definition 3. [Unification Problem, Unifier]
If F is a signature and E is a set of identities, then an E-Unification Problem over F is a finite set of equations [28] , we adopt functional programming convention and use an underscore ( ) in a formula, when the value in it doesn't affect the truthness of the formula.
A complete set of E-Unifiers of an E-Unification Problem Γ is a set C of idempotent E-Unifiers of Γ such that for each θ ∈ U E (Γ) there exists σ ∈ C with σ ≥ E θ, where ≥ E is a partial order on U E (Γ).
An E-Unification Algorithm takes an E-Unification Problem Γ and returns a finite, complete set of E-Unifiers.
Hence forth, we will abbreviate "Unification Algorithm" to UA and "Unification Problem" to UP.
Two theories = E 1 and = E 2 are disjoint if E 1 and E 2 do not use any common function symbols. UAs for two disjoint theories may be combined to output the complete set of unifiers for UPs made with operators from both the theories, using Baader & Schulz Combination Algorithm (BSCA) [2] .
Protocol Model
We will now introduce our protocol model, which is based on the strand space framework [42] .
Definition 4. [Node, Strand, Protocol] A node is a tuple ±, t denoted ±t where t ∈ T (F, Vars). A strand is a sequence of nodes. A protocol is a set of strands called "roles".
Informally, we write +t if a node "sends" term t and −t if it "receives" t. Further, if s, t is a node, then, s, t σ = s, tσ .
As an example for strands and protocols, consider the NSL ⊕ protocol presented in Section 2. This protocol that has two roles, role A and role B . i.e.,
We define a function Terms() to return all the terms in the nodes of a strand. If r is a strand, then,
We will also overload the functions Vars(), Constants(), and SubTerms() that were previously defined on sets of terms to strands in the obvious way. For instance, if s is a strand, then,
A semi-bundle S for a protocol P is a set of strands formed by applying substitutions to some of the variables in the strands of P : If P is a protocol, then, semi-bundle(S, P ) ⇒ (∀s ∈ S)((∃r ∈ P ; σ)(s = rσ)).
For instance, S = {s a1 , s a2 , s b1 , s b2 } below is a semi-bundle for the NSL ⊕ protocol with two strands per role of the protocol:
(Note: As stated earlier, we use lower-case symbols for constants and upper-case for variables).
We will assume that every protocol has a set of variables that are considered "fresh variables" (e.g. Nonces and Session-keys). If P is a protocol, then, FreshVars(P ) denotes the set of fresh variables in P . We will call the constants substituted to fresh variables of a protocol in its semi-bundles as "fresh constants" and denote them as FreshCons(S). i.e., If semi-bundle(S, P ), then,
We assume that some fresh variables are "secret variables" and denote them as SecVars(P ). We define "SecConstants()" to return "secret constants" that were used to instantiate secret variables of a protocol: If semi-bundle(S, P ), then,
For instance, N A and N B are secret variables in the NSL ⊕ protocol and n a1 , n a2 , n b1 , n b2 are the secret constants for its semi-bundle above.
We will lift the functions Vars(), Constants(), SubTerms(), and Terms() that were previously defined on sets of terms and strands, to sets of strands. For instance, if S is a set of strands, then, SubTerms(S) = {t | (∃x ∈ S)(t ∈ SubTerms(x))}, Constants(S) = Constants(SubTerms(S)), Vars(S) = Vars(SubTerms(S)), Terms(S) = {t | (∃s ∈ S)(t ∈ Terms(s))}.
We denote the long-term shared-keys of a protocol P as LTKeys(P ), where,
To achieve our main results, we need to make some assumptions. Most of our assumptions are reasonable, not too restrictive for protocol design and in fact, good design practices that improve security.
Before we start off with our first assumption, we will define a predicate well-typed() on substitutions such that a substitution is said to be well-typed, if the type of the variable is the same as that of the term it is substituted for:
(∀t ∈ T (F, Vars); X ∈ Vars)((well-typed(t/X) ⇐⇒ (type(t) = type(X)))).
We extend well-typed() on sets of substitutions such that a set of substitutions is welltyped if all its elements are well-typed:
(∀σ)(well-typed(σ) ⇐⇒ (∀t/X ∈ σ)(well-typed(t/X))).
We will now use this predicate to describe our first assumption which states that the substitutions that are used on roles to form semi-strands, are always well-typed. This assumption is needed to achieve our result on type-flaw attacks.
Assumption 1. (Honest agent substitutions are always well-typed)
If σ is a set of substitutions that was used on a role to form a semi-strand, then σ is well-typed:
As noted in [14] , for protocol composition or independence to hold, we first need an assumption that long-term shared-keys are never sent as part of the payload of messages in protocols, but only used as encryption keys. Obviously, this is a prudent and secure design principle.
Without this assumption, there could be multi-protocol attacks even when GuttmanThayer suggestion of tagging encryptions is followed. For instance, consider the following protocols:
Now the message in the second protocol could be decrypted with sh(a, s) and n a could be derived from it, when it is run with the first protocol.
To formalize this assumption, we define a relation interm denoted ⋐ on terms such that, a term t is an interm of t ′ if it is a subterm of t ′ , but does not appear as an encryption key or inside a hash or a private-key signature. Formally,
Notice that an interm is also a subterm, but a subterm is not necessarily an interm. For instance, n a is an interm and a subterm of n a ⊕ [a]
, while n b is a subterm, but not an interm.
Interms are useful in referring to the plain text of encryptions and in general, the "payload" of messages. i.e., everything that can be "read" by the recipient of a term. Contrast these with the keys of encrypted terms, which can only be confirmed by decrypting with the corresponding inverses, but cannot be read (unless included in the plain-text).
Assumption 2.
If P is a protocol, then, there is no term of P with a long-term key as an interm:
It turns out that this assumption is not sufficient. As noted by an anonymous reviewer of a workshop version of this paper [30] , we also need another assumption that if a variable is used as a subterm of a key, then there should be no message in which that variable is sent in plain (since a long-term shared-key could be substituted to the variable as a way around the previous assumption).
Hence, we state our next assumption as follows:
k is a subterm of a protocol, then no variable of k is an interm of the protocol:
Next, we will make some assumptions on the initial intruder knowledge. We will denote the set of terms known to the intruder before protocols are run, IIK . We will first formalize the assumption that he knows the public-keys of all the agents:
In addition, we will also assume that the attacker knows the values of all the constants that were substituted by honest agents for all the non-fresh variables (e.g. agent identities a, b etc.), when they form semi-strands:
Finally, we make another conventional assumption about protocols, namely that honest agents do not reuse fresh values such as nonces and session-keys:
Constraints and Satisfiability
In this section, we will formalize the concepts of generating symbolic constraints from node interleavings of semi-bundles and also the application of symbolic reduction rules to determine satisfiability of those constraints. These concepts are derived from the works of Millen-Shmatikov [37] and Chevalier [5] , who later extended Millen-Shmatikov's model with the XOR operator.
Formalizing constraint satisfiability allows us to rigorously model and reason about protocol executions and the security properties held within the executions: A satisfiable constraint sequence leads to a substitution when rules are applied on it and the substitution can be applied on protocols to generate protocol executions.
Definition 5. [Constraints, Constraint sequences]
A constraint is a tuple m, T denoted m : T , where m is a term called the target and T is a set of terms, called the term set: (∀m : T in cs)((∃s ∈ S; n in s)(n = −m)).
(b) every term in every term set of cs is from a '+' node of a strand in S:
(∀m : T in cs; t ∈ T )((∃s ∈ S; n in s)(n = +t)).
A "simple" constraint is a constraint whose target term is a variable. i.e., A constraint m : T is simple if m is a variable:
A "simple" constraint sequence is a sequence with all simple constraints. i.e., If cs is a constraint sequence, then, simple(cs) ⇒ (∀c in cs)(simple(c)).
The "active constraint" of a constraint sequence is the constraint in the sequence whose prior constraints are all simple constraints: We denote the sequence of constraints before the active constraint c of a constraint sequence cs as cs < and those after c as cs > . i.e.,
if active(c, cs) is true, where ⌢ is the sequence concatenation operator. Next, we define some symbolic reduction rules that can be applied on the active constraint of a constraint sequence. We name the set of all such rules as Rules where Rules = {un, ksub, join, split, senc, penc, sdec, pdec, hash, sig, xor l , xor r }.
Before defining the rules, we will explain a notation. If c = m : T is a constraint and τ is a set of substitutions, then, cτ = mτ : T τ.
In Table 1 , we define Rules, that can be applied on the active constraint of a constraint sequence.
The first column is the name of the rule, the second and third columns are the active constraints before and after the application of the rule.
We define a predicate applicable() on each of these rules, that is true if the rule under consideration is applicable on the active constraint of the given constraint sequence. The predicate takes the name of the rule, the input sequence cs, the output sequence cs ′ , input substitution σ, output substitution σ ′ , and the theory Th considered as arguments. For instance, we define xor r as follows:
Note that we did not use brackets {} for singleton sets, to avoid notational clutter. For instance, we write m : T ∪ t 1 , instead of m : T ∪ {t 1 } since it is unambiguous.
We left out two important rules in the table, un and ksub, that are the only rules that change the attacker substitution through unification. We describe them next:
ǫ is a constant of type Agent, representing the name of the attacker, always belonging to IIK ).
We will say that a constraint sequence cs ′ is a child constraint sequence of another sequence cs, if it can be obtained after applying some reduction rules on cs in the theory Th:
We now define "normal" constraint sequences, where the active constraint does not have sequences on the target or in the term set and has stand-alone variables in the term set (also recall that by definition, the target term of an active constraint is not a variable):
Next, we will define a recursive function, normalize(), that maps constraints to constraint sequences such that:
We will now overload this function to apply it on constraint sequences as well:
We define satisfiability of constraints as a predicate "satisfiable" which is true if there is a sequence of applicable rules which reduce a given normal constraint sequence cs to a simple constraint sequence cs n , in a theory Th, resulting in a substitution σ n :
Notice the last clause which requires that every constraint sequence be normalized before any rule is applied, when checking for satisfiability.
This definition of satisfiability may seem unusual, especially for the puritans, since satisfiability is usually defined using attacker capabilities as operators on sets of ground terms to generate each target on constraints.
However, it was proven in [5] that the decision procedure on which our definition is based, is sound and complete with respect to attacker capabilities on ground terms in the presence of the algebraic properties of XOR. Hence, we defined it directly in terms of the decision procedure, since we will be using only that to prove our main theorem. We refer the interested reader to [37] and [5] for more details on the underlying attacker operators, whose usage is equated to the decision procedure that we have used.
Note also that our definition only captures completeness of the decision procedure wrt satisfiability, not soundness, since that is the only aspect we need for our proofs in this paper.
Security properties and attacks
Every security protocol is designed to achieve certain goals (e.g. secure key establishment, authentication). Correspondingly, every execution of a protocol is expected to satisfy some security properties. For instance, a key establishment protocol should not leak the key being established, which would be a violation of secrecy. Similarly, a key establishment protocol should not lead an honest agent to exchange a key with an attacker which would be a violation of both secrecy and authentication.
Security properties such as secrecy can be tested if they hold on executions of protocols, by forming semi-bundles of the protocols, forming constraint sequences from the semi-bundles, adding the desired property to be tested to the constraint sequences and then checking if the resulting constraint sequence is satisfiable.
For instance, consider the following constraint sequence from a semi-bundle of the NSL ⊕ protocol:
The first three constraints are obtained from a semi-bundle with one strand per role of the NSL ⊕ protocol. The last constraint is an artificial constraint added to them, to test if secrecy is violated in the sequence.
If the constraint sequence is solved by applying the rules previously defined, it shows that the nonce n b , which is supposedly secret, can be obtained by the attacker by interleaving the messages of honest agents a and b. Specifically, we would apply penc to the first constraint, and split it into [1, N A , A] : T 1 and pk (b) : T 1 . We would then apply pair to split the former into three constraints: 1 : T 1 , N A : T 1 , and A : T 1 . Next, rule un is applied on the second constraint, unifying terms [2, n a ⊕ B, N B ] pk (a) and [2, N A ⊕ b, n b ] pk (A) . The resulting unifier {n a ⊕b⊕i/N A , ǫ/B, n b /N B }, is applied on the term in the third constraint,
. Finally, n b can be extracted from this term using pdec and pair, satisfying the last constraint.
Our definition of type-flaw attacks is general, and is valid for any property such as secrecy that can be tested on satisfiable constraint sequences from semi-bundles of protocols.
Definition 6. [Type-flaw attack]
A protocol has a type-flaw attack in the theory Th iff there exists a semi-bundle from the protocol that has a constraint sequence satisfiable only with a substitution that is not well-typed: i.e., if P is a protocol, then:
While our result on type-flaw attack is general and valid for any trace property, we achieve our other result on multi-protocol attacks in the context of secrecy (extensible to other properties such as authentication). Accordingly, we provide a definition for the property below.
Definition 7. [Secrecy]
A
protocol is secure for secrecy in the theory Th, if no constraint sequence from semibundles of the protocol is satisfiable, after a constraint with its target as a secret constant of the semi-bundle and its term set as the term set of the last constraint of the sequence is added as the last constraint of the sequence. i.e., if P is a protocol, then,
secureForSecrecy(P, Th) ⇔ (∄sec, cs, S)     semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ conseq(cs, S)∧ (cs = [ : , . . . , : T ])∧ (sec ∈ SecConstants(S))∧ satisfiable(cs ⌢ [sec : T ], σ, Th)     .
Main Requirements -NUT and µ-NUT
We now formulate our main requirements on protocol messages to prevent all type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks in the = S∪A theory 3 . The requirements are slight variations of the suggestions by Heather et al. and Guttman et al., who suggest inserting distinct component numbers inside encryptions. In a symbolic model, such component numbering guarantees NUT (Non-Unifiability of encrypted Terms).
We will first define a function EncSubt() that returns all the encrypted subterms of a term 4 :
where, if m is a term, then, EncSubt(m) is the set of all terms such that if t belongs to the set, then t must be a subterm of m and is an encryption, hash or signature:
Further, if S is a set of strands, then, it's encrypted subterms are the encryptions of it's subterms:
Definition 8. [NUT]
A protocol P is NUT-Satisfying, i.e.,
NUT-Satisfying(P ) iff (a) An encrypted subterm of the protocol is not STD-Unifiable with any other nonvariable subterm of the protocol:
(b) A key used in an asymmetric encryption is not a free variable:
, is a subterm of P , then, no two terms in {t 1 , . . . , t n } are STD-Unifiable, unless they are equal:
The first requirement can be satisfied by simply inserting distinct component numbers inside distinct encrypted subterms of a protocol, as was done in the NSL ⊕ protocol in Section 2.
The second requirement can be satisfied by adding a distinct constant to the key of an asymmetric encryption, if it was a free variable. For instance, [1,
The third requirement can also be satisfied in much the same way as the other two. We can add a distinct constant to each textually distinct variable inside an XOR term. For instance, the second message in the original NSL ⊕ protocol was
With the number '2' inside this message and numbers '1' and '3' inside the others, the protocol satisfied the first requirement above, but was still vulnerable to an attack. The third requirement above requires that the second message be changed to,
that prevents the attack. Next we deal with multi-protocol environments. Our requirement defined below, namely µ-NUT, ensures that encrypted terms in different protocols cannot be replayed into one another. The requirement is an extension of Guttman-Thayer's suggestion to make encrypted terms distinguishable across protocols, to include XOR as well.
We first define a set XorTerms as:
We are now ready to state the main requirement formally:
Definition 9. [µ-NUT]
Two protocols P 1 and P 2 are µ-NUT-Satisfying, i.e., µ-NUT-Satisfying(P 1 , P 2 ) iff:
Encrypted subterms in both protocols are not STD-Unifiable after applying any substitutions to them:
(∀t 1 ∈ EncSubt(P 1 ), t 2 ∈ EncSubt(P 2 ))((∀σ 1 , σ 2 )(U STD (t 1 σ 1 , t 2 σ 2 )) = {}).
Subterms of XOR-terms of one protocol (that are not XOR-terms themselves), are not STD-Unifiable with any subterms of XOR-terms of the other protocol (that are not XOR-terms as well):
The first requirement is the same as Guttman-Thayer suggestion. The second requirement extends it to the case of XOR-terms, which is our stated extension in this paper.
The NSL ⊕ protocol can be transformed to suit this requirement by tagging its encrypted messages as follows:
The constant "nsl ⊕ " inside the encryptions can be encoded using some suitable bitencoding when the protocol is implemented. Obviously, other protocols must have their encrypted subterms start with the names of those protocols.
We will later use this requirement in Section 5.2 to prove that this is sufficient to prevent all multi-protocol attacks on security protocols, even when they use the XOR operator.
Some Lemmas
In this section, we provide some useful lemmas that we will use later in our main theorems.
• In Section 4.1, we prove that if two non-variable StdOps-terms were obtained by applying two well-typed substitutions for the same term, then the unifier for the two terms is necessarily well-typed;
• In Section 4.2, we first introduce Baader & Schulz Combination Algorithm (BSCA) to find unifiers for UPs from two disjoint theories, say = E 1 and = E 2 [2] . We will then prove that if the unifier for the E 1 -UP from a given (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UP, say Γ, is empty, then the combined unifier is simply equal to the unifier for the E 2 -UP from Γ;
• In Section 4.3, we prove that all ACUN-UPs formed by using BSCA on an original (S ∪ A)-UP that does not have free variables in XOR terms, have only constants as subterms.
Well-typed standard terms unify only under well-typed unifiers
In our first lemma, we prove that two StdOps-terms obtained by instantiating the same StdOps-term, with well-typed substitutions, unify only under a well-typed substitution: 
and every x/X ∈ σ 1 ∪ σ 2 is such that x is pure wrt = STD :
then, any unifier for t 1 and t 2 , will be necessarily well-typed:
Proof. Let t = op(t ′ 1 , . . . , t ′ n ) where op ∈ StdOps. Now,
. Let τ be a set of substitutions. Then, we have that,
For instance, if (t
then, since well-typed(σ 1 ) and well-typed(σ 2 ), we have,
and well-typed(y/X). Thus, we conclude:
Given this, let us now assume for the purpose of induction that a unifier for t 
Combining (2) and (3), we can conclude that all the unifiers for t 
This implies that our hypothesis is true:
Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty
Our next two lemmas are related to the combined unification of (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UPs, where = E 1 and = E 2 are disjoint.
We first define the variables of a UP, Γ, as Vars(Γ), where every element of Vars(Γ) is a variable and a subterm of a UP in Γ:
Similarly,
Further, we will say that term t belongs to a UP, say Γ, even if t is one of the terms of one of the problems in Γ. i.e.,
We will now explain how two UAs A E 1 and A E 2 for two disjoint theories = E 1 and = E 2 respectively, may be combined to output the unifiers for a (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UP using Baader & Schulz Combination Algorithm (BSCA) [2] . We give a more detailed explanation in Appendix A.2 using an example UP for the interested reader.
BSCA takes as input a (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UP, say Γ, and applies some transformations on them to derive Γ 5.1 and Γ 5.2 that are sets of E 1 -UP and E 2 -UPs respectively. We outline the steps in this process below (we formalize these steps directly in Lemma 3 where we use BSCA in detail):
Step 1 (Purify terms) BSCA first "purifies" the given (E = E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UP, Γ, into a new UP, Γ 1 , with the introduction of some new variables, such that, all the terms are "pure" wrt
Step 2. (Purify problems) Next, BSCA purifies Γ 1 into Γ 2 such that, every UP in Γ 2 has both terms pure wrt the same theory, = E 1 or = E 2 .
Step 3. (Variable identification) Next, BSCA partitions Vars(Γ 2 ) into a partition VarIdP such that, each variable in Γ 2 is replaced with a representative from the same equivalence class in VarIdP. The result is Γ 3 .
Step 4. (Split the problem) The next step of BSCA is to split Γ 3 into two UPs Γ 4.1 and Γ 4.2 such that, each set has every problem with terms that are pure wrt = E 1 or = E 2 respectively.
Step 5. (Solve systems) The penultimate step of BSCA is to partition all the variables in Γ 3 into a size of two: Let p = {V 1 , V 2 } is a partition of Vars(Γ 3 ). Then, the earlier problems (Γ 4.1 , Γ 4.2 ) are further split such that, all the variables in one set of the partition are replaced with new constants in the other set and vice-versa. The resulting sets are Γ 5.1 and Γ 5.2 .
Step 6. (Combine unifiers) The final step of BSCA is to combine the unifiers for Γ
Definition 10. [Combined Unifier]
Let Γ be a E-UP where
Let least(X, T, <) be defined as the minimal element of set T , when ordered linearly by the relation '<'. i.e.,
Then, the combined UA for Γ, namely A E 1 ∪E 2 , is defined such that,
where, if σ = σ 1 ⊙ σ 2 , then,
• The substitution in σ for the least variable in V 1 and V 2 is from σ 1 and σ 2 respectively:
• For all other variables X, where each Y with Y < X has a substitution already defined, define Xσ = Xσ i σ (i ∈ {1, 2}):
It has been proven in [2] that the combination algorithm defined above is a (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UA for any (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UP if E 1 -UA and E 2 -UA are known to exist and if = E 1 , = E 2 are disjoint. The combination of STD and ACUN UAs which is of interest to us in this paper has been explained to be finitary (i.e., return a finite number of unifiers) when combined using BSCA [43] .
We now prove a simple lemma which states that the combined unifier of two unifiers is equal to one of the unifiers, if the other unifier is empty.
Lemma 2. [Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty]
Let Γ, σ, σ 1 , σ 2 , V 1 , V 2 , and < be as defined above in Def. 10 . Then,
Proof. Let Vars(σ) = {X | /X ∈ σ}. From Def. 10, if σ = σ 1 ⊙ σ 2 , then,
But since σ 2 = {} and V 2 = {}, we have,
Also from Def. 10,
Again, since σ 2 = {} and V 2 = {}, this implies,
Combining (4) and (5), we have,
Further, since σ 2 = {}, and V 2 = {}, we have Vars(σ) = Vars(σ 1 ) = V 1 and hence, combining this with (6), we have σ = σ 1 .
ACUN-UPs in NUT-Satisfying protocols have only constants as subterms
Our next lemma is a bit lengthy. This lemma is the lynchpin of the paper and forms the crux of our two main theorems in Section 5. It concerns combined UPs involving the disjoint theories, = STD and = ACUN . We prove that, if we follow BSCA for finding unifiers for a (S ∪ A)-UP, say Γ, that do not have free variables inside XOR terms, the terms in all the ACUN-UPs (Γ 5.2 ) from those will always have only constants as subterms. Consequently, we will end up in an empty set of substitutions returned by the ACUN-UA for Γ 5.2 , even when their terms are equal in the = ACUN theory.
Lemma 3. [ACUN-UPs have only constants as subterms]
Let Γ = {m
a (S ∪ A)-UP that is (S ∪ A)-Unifiable, and where no subterm of m or t is an XOR term with free variables:
Then,
Proof. Let σ be a set of substitutions s.t. σ ∈ A S∪A (Γ). Then, from Def. 10 (Combined Unifier), σ ∈ σ 1 ⊙ σ 2 , where σ 1 ∈ A STD (Γ 5.1 ) and
Suppose there is a term t in Γ with an alien subterm t ′ wrt the theory = ACUN (e.g.
Then, from the definition of Γ 2 , it must have been replaced with a new variable in Γ 2 . i.e.,
. (7) where NewVars ⊂ Vars \ Vars(Γ).
Since XOR terms do not have free variables from hypothesis, it implies that every free variable in an XOR term in Γ 2 is a new variable:
Since every alien subterm of every term in Γ has been replaced with a new variable (7), combining it with (8), XOR terms in Γ 2 must now have only constants and/or new variables as subterms:
Let VarIdP be a partition of Vars(Γ 2 ) and Γ 3 = Γ 2 ρ, such that
where ρ is the set of substitutions where each set of variables in VarIdP has been replaced with one of the variables in the set:
Can there exist a substitution X/Y in ρ such that Y ∈ NewVars and X ∈ Vars(Γ)? To find out, consider the following two statements:
• From (7), every new variable Y in Γ 2 belongs to a STD-UP in Γ 2 :
• Further, from hypothesis, we have that XOR terms in Γ do not have free variables.
Hence, every free variable is a proper subterm 5 of a purely = STD term:
The above two statements are contradictory: It is not possible that a new variable and an existing variable can be replaced with each other, since one belongs to a STD-UP, and another is always a proper subterm of a term that belongs to a STD-UP.
Hence, VarIdP cannot consist of sets where new variables are replaced by Vars(Γ). i.e.,
Writing (10) in (9), we have,
Further, if a variable belongs to a UP of Γ 3 , then the other term of the UP is pure wrt = STD theory:
where, β is a set of substitutions of new constants to V 1 :
From hypothesis, Γ 5.2 is ACUN-Unifiable. Hence, we have:
Now consider a σ s.t. σ ∈ A ACUN (Γ 5.2 ).
t is a proper subterm of t
From (11), we have that XOR terms in Γ 5.2 have only new variables and/or constants and from (12) we have that if X ∈ Vars(Γ 5.2 ), then there exists t s.t. X ? = STD t ∈ Γ 5.1 and t is pure wrt = STD theory.
Suppose V 2 = {}. Then, there is at least one variable, say X ∈ Vars(Γ 5.2 ). This implies that X is replaced with a constant (say x) in Γ 5.1 .
Since X is necessarily a new variable and one term of a STD-UP, this implies that x must equal some compound term made with StdOps.
However, a compound term made with StdOps can never equal a constant under the = STD theory:
( ∃op ∈ StdOps; t 1 , . . . , t n ; x ∈ Constants)(x = STD op(t 1 , . . . , t n )), a contradiction. Hence, σ = {}, V 2 = {} and our hypothesis is true that all XOR terms in Γ 5.2 necessarily contain only constants:
Main Results
In this section, we will prove our main results. We will first prove that NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to type-flaw attacks in Section 5.1. We will then prove that µ-NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to multi-protocol attacks in Section 5.2.
NUT prevents type-flaw attacks
We will now prove our first main result that NUT-Satisfying protocols will not have any type-flaw attacks. The main idea is to show that every unification when solving a constraint sequence from a NUT-Satisfying protocol results in a well-typed unifier. We follow the outline below:
1. We will first establish that normal constraint sequences from NUT-Satisfying protocols do not contain variables in the target or term set of their active constraints (either freely or inside XOR terms), but only subterms of the initial term set;
2. We then infer from Lemma 3 that if a (S ∪ A)-UP, say Γ, does not have free variables inside XOR terms, then terms in it's Γ 5.2 will have only constants as subterms;
3. Next, we infer in Lemma 1 that UPs in Γ 5.1 unify only under well-typed substitutions, if they were created from the same underlying term of the protocol, by applying two well-typed substitutions (which is true for semi-bundles from NUT-Satisfying protocols, under Assumption 1);
4. Finally, the combined unifier for Γ is simply the unifier for Γ 5.1 , from Lemma 2 (Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty), and hence is always welltyped.
Theorem 1.
NUT-Satisfying protocols are secure against type-flaw attacks in the = S∪A theory.
Proof. From Def. 6 (type-flaw attacks), a protocol is susceptible to type-flaw attacks if a constraint sequence from a semi-bundle of the protocol is satisfiable only with a substitution that is not well-typed. We will show that this never happens; i.e., every satisfiable constraint sequence from a semi-bundle of a NUT-Satisfying protocol is satisfiable only with a well-typed substitution.
Let P be a NUT-Satisfying protocol, S a semi-bundle from P , and cs a constraint sequence from S. Suppose cs is satisfiable with a substitution in the = S∪A theory. i.e., semi-bundle(S, P ) ∧ conseq(cs, S) ∧ satisfiable(cs, , = S∪A ).
From (1) (satisfiability), suppose we have r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Rules s.t.
Now every cs ′ i in (14) is normalized. Hence, their active constraints do not have variables in the targets or term sets. Further, since P is NUT-Satisfying, no term of the form t 1 ⊕. . .⊕t p (p > 1) can have a free variable in the set {t 1 , . . . , t p } (from NUT Condition 3). i.e.,
.
(15) From the set Rules it is clear that only un and ksub potentially change the set of substitutions, when applied to a constraint sequence. i.e., (∀r ∈ Rules)(applicable(r, , , σ, σ
Consider rules un and ksub:
applicable(un, cs, cs
= S∪A t} where m = m ′ σ m σ and t = t ′ σ t σ and for some r, r ′ ∈ P , rσ m , rσ t ∈ S.
Suppose τ ∈ U S∪A (Γ). Then, using Def. 10 (Combined Unifier), let τ ∈ τ STD ⊙ τ ACUN where τ STD ∈ A STD (Γ 5.1 ) and τ ACUN ∈ A ACUN (Γ 5.2 ).
From (15), we can infer that the conditions of Lemma 3 (ACUN UPs have only constants) are met:
And therefore, we infer from Lemma 3 that:
Now consider problems in Γ 5.1 . Suppose m 1 , t 1 ∈ Γ 5.1 . Let m 1 = xσ m σρα and t 1 = yσ t σρα, where σ is as defined in rule un; x, y ∈ SubTerms(P ); ρ as defined in Lemma 3 and α is a set of substitutions s.t.
where, α substitutes new constants to V 2 :
From Lemma 3, we have that Vars(Γ 5.2 ) = {}. Hence, α = {}. Also from Lemma 3, we have that, whenever Γ is (S ∪ A)-Unifiable, Γ 4.2 will not have any variables of Γ, and Γ 5.2 will not have any variables at all. Hence, we have that every partition of VarIdP (defined in Lemma 3) in which there is a variable of Γ, has only that variable and no others in the partition:
Now, Vars(Γ 5.1 ) = Vars(Γ) ∪ NewVars. From (19), we have,
Now,
• From (15), we have that m, t ∈ SubTerms(Sσ);
• From BSCA, if m, t ∈ SubTerms(Sσ), and m 1 , t 1 / ∈ NewVars, then m 1 and t 1 must belong to SubTerms(Sσρ);
• From NUT Conditions 1 and 3, if m 1 is STD-Unifiable with t 1 , then x must equal y.
If x = y, since well-typed(σ m ) and well-typed(σ t ) from Assumption 1 (Honest agent substitutions are always well-typed), assuming well-typed(σ), and well-typed(ρ) from (20), we can infer from Lemma 1 (Well-typed STD terms unify only under well-typed unifiers) that, well-typed(δ), where m 1 δ = STD t 2 δ, if none of NewVars exist as subterms of m 1 or t 1 : 
Suppose X/Y ∈ ρ, where X, Y ∈ NewVars (note that X or Y cannot belong to Vars(Γ) from equation (10) (21), we have well-typed(θ), where t 1 θ = STD t 2 θ, and hence, we have well-typed(X/Y ):
Combining (20) and (22), we have, well-typed(ρ). Given this, using induction on terms, we conclude similar to concluding (21) that every problem in Γ 5.1 unifies under a well-typed substitution:
(from Lemma 2 (Combined unifier when one of the unifier is empty))
Since well-typed(τ STD ) from above, this implies, well-typed(τ ).
Similarly, for ksub, we can conclude, well-typed(τ ), where τ ∈ A S∪A ({k ? = S∪A pk (ǫ)}), provided k is not a variable, and indeed it is not by NUT Condition 2.
So the only rules that potentially change the substitution (un, ksub) produce well-typed substitutions. We can apply this in (16) and write:
Since all other rules except un and ksub do not change the attacker substitution, we can combine the above statement with (14) and conclude:
(Note that we concluded well-typed(τ STD ) assuming that σ in rule un was well-typed. Thus, in (24), σ 1 is well-typed and inductively, all of σ 2 , . . . , σ n are well-typed).
Finally, we can combine the above statement with (13) and form:
From Def. 6 (type-flaw attack), this implies,
Since we started out assuming that P is a NUT-Satisfying protocol, we sum up noting that NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to type-flaw attacks.
µ-NUT prevents multi-protocol attacks
We will now prove that µ-NUT-Satisfying protocols are not susceptible to multi-protocol attacks.
The idea is to show that if a protocol is secure in isolation, then it is in combination with other protocols with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying.
To show this, we will achieve a contradiction by attempting to prove the contrapositive. i.e., if there is a breach of secrecy for a protocol in combination with another protocol with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying, then it must also have a breach of secrecy in isolation.
We will follow the outline below:
1. We will first form a constraint sequence from a semi-bundle that has semi-strands from the combination of a secure protocol and another protocol with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying;
2. We will then form another sequence that can be formed solely from a semi-bundle of the secure protocol by extracting it from the constraint sequence of the combination of semi-bundles;
3. Finally, we will show that any reduction rules to satisfy the former resulting in a breach of secrecy can be equally applied on the latter, resulting in a breach of secrecy in it as well (thereby achieving a contradiction).
We are now ready to prove our second main theorem.
Theorem 2.
In the = S∪A theory, if a protocol is secure for secrecy, then it remains so in combination with any other protocol with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying.
Proof. Suppose P 1 is a protocol that is secure for secrecy in isolation in the = S∪A theory. i.e.,
Consider another protocol P 2 such that, µ-NUT-Satisfying(P 1 , P 2 ). Let, S 1 and S 2 be two semi-bundles from P 1 and P 2 respectively:
Consider a constraint sequence combcs from S comb = S 1 ∪S 2 . i.e., conseq(combcs, S comb ). Consider another constraint sequence isocs, where, (a) Targets in combcs are targets in isocs if the targets belong to S 1 :
(b) Term sets in combcs are term sets in isocs but without terms from S 2 :
(28) Then, from Def. 5 (Constraints) we have that isocs is a constraint sequence from S 1 alone. i.e., conseq(isocs, S 1 ).
Suppose combcs and isocs are normalized. To achieve a contradiction, let there be a violation of secrecy in S comb s.t. combcs is satisfiable after an artificial constraint with a secret constant of S 1 , say sec, is added to it:
Suppose [r 1 , . . . , r n ] = R, such that r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Rules. Then, from the definition of satisfiability (1), using R, say we have:
From their descriptions, every rule in Rules adds subterms of existing terms (if any) in the target or term set of the active constraint:
Since every combcs (30) is normalized, and since P 1 and P 2 are µ-NUT-Satisfying, we have that no XOR term in the target or term sets of any of combcs ′ i (i = 1 to n) have free variables:
Suppose chcombcs is a normal, child constraint sequence of combcs and chisocs is a normal, child constraint sequence of isocs.
un and ksub are the only rules that affect the attacker substitution. We will show that these are equally applicable on chcombcs and chisocs. Suppose:
• Variables in σ comb are substituted with terms from the same semi-bundle:
(This is vacuously true if un or ksub were never applied on combcs, to derive chcombcs, since σ comb is then empty).
• Γ is (S ∪ A)-Unifiable.
Let τ ∈ A S∪A (Γ). Then, from Def. 10 (Combined Unifier), τ ∈ τ STD ⊙ τ ACUN , where Variables. If m 1 , and/or t 1 are variables, from (32) and BSCA, they are necessarily new i.e., m 1 , t 1 ∈ Vars \ Vars(Γ) (unless m and t are variables, which they are not, since chcombcs is normal). Hence, there are no new substitutions in θ to Vars(Γ) in this case.
Constants.
If m 1 ∈ Constants(S 1 ), again from BSCA, t 1 cannot belong to Vars, and it must be a constant. If m 1 is a fresh constant of S 1 , then t 1 must also belong to S 1 from Assumption 6 (freshness) and (33) , and if m 1 is not fresh, t 1 could belong to either SubTerms(S 1 ) or IIK from Assumption 5. Further, θ = {}. In that case, t must also equal t 1 , whence, t can belong to IIK from assumption 4 (Intruder possesses all public-keys). Hence, we have that, (∀x/X ∈ θ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x, X ∈ SubTerms(S i ))). Shared keys. m 1 cannot be a long-term shared-key; i.e., m 1 = sh( , ), since from Assumptions 2 and 3, they do not appear as interms and from the definition of Γ 5.1 , m 1 is necessarily an interm.
Encrypted Subterms. Suppose m 1 = m 11 σ comb ρ, t 1 = t 11 σ comb ρ, where m 11 , t 11 ∈ EncSubt(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) and ρ is a set of substitutions from VarIdP defined in Lemma 3. Then, from µ-NUT Condition 1 and (31), we have, m 11 , t 11 ∈ EncSubt(S i ), where i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, (∀x/X ∈ θ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x, X ∈ SubTerms(S i ))).
Sequences.
If m 1 is a sequence, either m must be a sequence, or there must be some . . . ⊕ m 1 ⊕ . . . belonging to SubTerms({m, t}), from BSCA. But m and t cannot be sequences, since chcombcs is normal. Hence, by µ-NUT Condition 2 and (31), m 1 , t 1 ∈ SubTerms(S i )σ comb ρ, i ∈ {1, 2} and (∀x/X ∈ θ)((∃i ∈ {1, 2})(x, X ∈ SubTerms(S i ))).
In summary, we make the following observations about problems in Γ 5.1 . If m 1 is an instantiation of a subterm in S 1 , then so is t 1 , or t 1 belongs to IIK :
Every substitution in τ STD has both its term and variable from the same semi-bundle:
Now consider the UPs in Γ 5.2 . Applying (32) into Lemma 3, we have that τ ACUN = {}. Combining this with (35), we have:
Informally, this means that, no two terms in {m
From (34) and µ-NUT, this means that m ∈ SubTerms(S 1 )σ comb implies, t also belongs to SubTerms(S 1 )σ comb or IIK . Now since Vars(m ′ )∪Vars(t ′ ) ⊂ Vars(S 1 ), we have, m ′ σ comb = m ′ σ iso , and t ′ σ comb = t ′ σ iso , where σ comb = σ iso ∪ {x/X | x, X ∈ SubTerms(S 2 )}. Combining this with (36), we have that,
Combining these with (27) and (28), we can now write:
(37) where, the active constraint in chcombcs and chisocs only differ in the term sets:
From (35) we have, (∀t ∈ SubTerms(S 1 ))(tσ comb = tσ iso ), and hence we have that all the rules in Rules \ {un, ksub} are applicable on the target of the active constraint of chisocs, if they were on chcombcs, provided they are applied on a term in SubTerms(S 1 ):
Similarly, all rules that are applicable on a term in the term set of the active constraint in chcombcs, say c, are also applicable on the same term of the active constraint in chisocs, say c ′ (provided the term exists in the term set of c ′ , which it does from (28) and (31)):
Finally, we can combine, (30) , (38) , (39) , and (37) to infer:
(40) where [r 1 , . . . , r p ] is a subsequence 6 of R (defined in 30). This in turn implies satisfiable(isocs ⌢ sec : T, σ p , = S∪A ) from the definition of satisfiability. 6 s ′ is a subsequence of a sequence s, if s = ⌢ s ′⌢ .
We can then combine this with the fact that S 1 is a semi-bundle of P 1 , and isocs is a constraint sequence of S 1 and conclude:
But from Definition 7 (Secrecy), this implies, ¬secureForSecrecy(P 1 , = S∪A ), a contradiction to the hypothesis. Hence, P 1 is always secure for secrecy in the = S∪A theory, in combination with P 2 (or any other set of protocols) with which it is µ-NUT-Satisfying.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provided formal proofs that tagging to ensure non-unifiability of distinct encryptions prevents type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks under the ACUN properties induced by the Exclusive-OR operator. We will now discuss some prospects for future work and related work.
Future work
Our results can be achieved under other equational theories the same way as we achieved them under the ACUN theory: When we use BSCA, the unification algorithms for the other theories will return an empty unifier, since their problems will have only constants as subterms. Hence, unifiers only from the standard unification algorithm need to be considered, which are always well-typed for NUT-Satisfying protocols. In addition, this reasoning has to be given within a symbolic constraint solving model that takes the additional equational theories into account (the model we used, adapted from [5] was tailored to accommodate only ACUN).
Our result on type-flaw attacks is obviously independent of security properties: It is valid for any property that can be tested on all possible protocol execution traces. Hence, we conjecture that it will also be valid for properties such as observational equivalence, which has been of interest to many protocol researchers of late (e.g. [3, 17] ). However, this property has been traditionally defined only in the applied pi-calculus. To use the results of this paper, we would have to first define an equivalent definition with symbolic constraint solving which is the model used in this paper (perhaps by extending [13] ).
We achieved our result on multi-protocol attacks, specifically for secrecy. The reason for this was that, in order to prove that attacks exist in isolation, if they did in combination, we had to have a precise definition as to what an "attack" was to begin with. However, other properties such as authentication and observational equivalence can be considered on a case-by-case basis with similar proof pattern.
At the core of our proofs is the use of BSCA. However, their algorithm only works for disjoint theories that do not share any operators. For instance, the algorithm cannot consider equations of the form,
We plan to expand our proofs to include such equations in future. However, it can be easily seen that the proof of Theorem 1 falls apart under this equation. For instance, consider the following unification problem:
Now this problem is not unifiable under = S∪A theory, but it is when we add the new equation above to the theory, since N A can be substituted with n b ⊕ a ⊕ b to make the terms equal, which is an ill-typed substitution. It does not seem that a similar effect exists on multi-protocol attacks, but we intend to investigate further in that direction.
The most significant advantage of being able to prevent type-flaw attacks is that analysis could be restricted to well-typed runs only. This has been shown to assist decidability results in the standard, free theory [28, 40] but not under monoidal theories. We are currently in a pursuit to achieve a decidability result for protocol security in the presence of XOR.
Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the consideration of algebraic properties and/or equational theories for type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks is unchartered waters with the exception of a recent paper [9] .
Type-flaw attacks. Type-flaw attacks on password protocols were studied by Malladi et al. in [31] . That is the closest that we know about any study of type-flaw attacks where the perfect encryption assumption was relaxed. Some recent works studied type-flaw attacks using new approaches such as rewriting [38] , and process calculus LySa [19] . However, they do not discuss type-flaw attacks under operators with algebraic properties.
Recently in [34] , we gave a proof sketch that tagging prevents type-flaw attacks even under XOR. The current paper is an extended, journal version of [34] with the addition of a new result for multi-protocol attacks.
A proof was presented in Malladi's PhD dissertation [29] that type-flaw attacks can be prevented by component numbering with the constraint solving model of [37] as the framework. A similar proof approach was taken by Arapinis et al. in [1] using Comon et al.'s constraint solving model [12] as the framework. In [7] , we used the proof style of [29] to prove the decidability of tagged protocols that use XOR with the underlying framework of [5] which extends [37] with XOR. That work is similar to our proofs since we too use the same framework ( [5] ). Further, we use BSCA as a core aspect of this paper along the lines of [7] .
Multi-protocol attacks. Kelsey et al. in their classical work [25] showed that for any protocol, another protocol can be designed to attack it. Cremers studied the feasibility of multi-protocol attacks on published protocols and found many attacks, thereby demonstrating that they are a genuine threat to protocol security [16] . However, Cremers did not consider algebraic properties in the analysis.
A study of multi-protocol attacks with the perfect encryption assumption relaxed were first studied by Malladi et al. in [32] through "multi-protocol guessing attacks" on password protocols. Delaune et al. proved that these can be prevented by tagging in [17] .
The original work of Guttman et al. in [21] assumed that protocols would not have type-flaw attacks when they proved that tagging/disjoint encryption prevents multi-protocol attacks. But a recent work by Guttman seems to relax that assumption [20] . Both [21] and [20] use the strand space model [42] . Our protocol model in this paper is also based on strand spaces but the penetrator actions are modeled as symbolic reduction rules in the constraint solving algorithm of [5, 37] , as opposed to penetrator strands in [42] . CortierDelaune also seem to prove that multi-protocol attacks can be prevented with tagging, which is slightly different from [21] and considers composed/non-atomic keys [15] . They too seem to use constraint satisfiability to model penetrator capabilities.
None of the above works considered the XOR operator or any other operator that possesses algebraic properties.
In a recent paper that is about to appear in the CSF symposium, Ciobaca and Cortier seem to present protocol composition for arbitrary primitives under equational theories with and without the use of tagging [9] . Their results seem very general and broadly applicable. As future work, they comment in the conclusion of that paper that it is a challenging open problem to address cases where multiple protocols uses XOR, which is solved in this paper.
XOR operator.
Ryan and Schneider showed in [41] that new attacks can be launched on protocols when the algebraic properties of the XOR operator are exploited. In [6] , Chevalier et al. described the first NP-decision procedure to analyze protocols that use the XOR operator with a full consideration of its algebraic properties. We use an adapted version of their NSL protocol in this paper as a running example. In an impressive piece of work, Chevalier also introduced a symbolic constraint solving algorithm for analyzing protocols with XOR, which we use as our framework in this paper [5] .
In an interesting work [26] , Kuesters and Truderung showed that the verification of protocols that use the XOR operator can be reduced to verification in a free term algebra, for a special class of protocols called ⊕-linear protocols 7 , so that ProVerif can be used for verification.
Chen et al. recently report an extension of Kuesters-Truderung to improve the efficiency of verification by reducing the number of substitutions that need to be considered (thereby improving the performance of ProVerif), and a new bounded process verification approach to verify protocols that do not satisfy the ⊕-linearity property [4] .
These results have a similarity with ours, in the sense that we too show that the algebraic properties of XOR have no effect when some of the messages are modified to suit our requirements.
A few months back, Chevalier-Rusinowitch report a nice way to compile cryptographic protocols into executable roles and retain the results for combination of equational theories in the context of compiling [8] . Like other works described above, their work does not seem to use tagging. typeFlawAttack(P, Th) true if a constraint sequence from a semi-bundle of P can only be satisfied with an ill-typed substitution in the theory Th;
secureForSecrecy(P, Th) true if protocol P does not have a potential breach of secrecy in the theory Th;
NUT-Satisfying(P ) true if P satisfies three conditions including non-unifiable encrypted subterms (in the S ∪ A theory), no free variables as asymmetric keys inside XOR terms;
µ-NUT-Satisfying(P 1 , P 2 ) true if encrypted subterms of P 1 are non-unifiable with the encrypted subterms of P 2 , in the S ∪ A theory;
A.2 Bader & Schulz Combined Theory Unification Algorithm (BSCA)
We will now consider how two UAs for two disjoint theories = E 1 and = E 2 , may be combined to output the unifiers for (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UPs using Baader & Schulz Combination Algorithm (BSCA) [2] . We will use the following (S ∪ A)-UP as our running example 8 :
BSCA takes as input a (E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UP, say Γ, and applies some transformations on them to derive Γ 5.1 and Γ 5.2 that are E 1 -UP and E 2 -UP respectively.
Step 1 (Purify terms)
BSCA first "purifies" the given set of (E = E 1 ∪ E 2 )-UP, Γ, into a new set of problems Γ 1 , such that, all the terms are pure wrt = E 1 or = E 2 . 
Step 2. (Purify problems)
Next, BSCA purifies Γ 1 into Γ 2 such that, every problem in Γ 2 has both terms pure wrt the same theory.
For our example problem, this step can be skipped since all the problems in Γ 1 already have both their terms purely from the same theory (= STD or = ACUN )).
Step 3. (Variable identification)
Next, BSCA partitions Vars(Γ 2 ) into a partition VarIdP such that, each variable in Γ 2 is replaced with a representative from the same equivalence class in VarIdP. The result is Γ 3 .
In our example problem, one set of values for VarIdP can be {{A}, {B}, {N B }, {W }, {X}, {Y, Z}} .
Step 4. (Split the problem)
The next step of BSCA is to split Γ 3 into two UPs Γ 4.1 and Γ 4.2 such that, each of them has every problem with terms from the same theory, Th 1 or Th 2 . Following this in our example, Step
(Solve systems)
The penultimate step of BSCA is to partition all the variables in Γ 3 into a size of two: Let p = {V 1 , V 2 } is a partition of Vars(Γ 3 ). Then, the earlier problems (Γ 4.1 , Γ 4.2 ) are further split such that, all the variables in one set of the partition are replaced with new constants in the other set and vice-versa. The resulting sets are Γ 5.1 and Γ 5.2 .
In our sample problem, we can form {V 1 , V 2 } as {Vars(Γ 3 ), {}}. i.e., we choose that all the variables in problems of Γ 5.2 be replaced with new constants. This is required to find the unifier for the problem (this is the partition that will successfully find a unifier).
So = ACUN x ⊕ y ⊕ y .
i.e., β = {w/W, x/X, y/Y }, where, w, x, y are constants, which obviously did not appear in Γ 5.1 .
Step 6. (Combine unifiers)
The final step of BSCA is to combine the unifiers for Γ 5.1 and Γ 5.2 , obtained using A E 1 and A E 2 . This was given in Def. 10.
